Additional research for Postscript continued in September 2016 with regard to Ronald Halliman and follow-up on the posting by John Zimmerlee. According to his posting¹ “Same last Name appears among many others on blackboards Moo Hak school Seoul SK 9/20/1950. Men were then marched to Pyonyang and loaded on trains there heading North mid Oct 1950.”

Following a telephone call, a series of e-mail was exchanged with Mr. Zimmerlee who provided additional information and explanation of the information he had collected on Ronald Halliman and subsequently posted on his website, Korean War POW/MIA Network, www.koreanwarpowmia.net.

In the first of several e-mail exchanged September 8, 2016 Mr. Zimmerlee related “Ronald Halliman is listed as MIA 9/3/1950, yet my notes indicate a Cpl Hall with 8th cavalry stated Halliman died in camp 5. I have not been able to relocate that document.”

It continued² “About 300 men were in Moo Hak School in Seoul 20 Sept 1950. The Sunchon tunnel Massacre happened 20 October 1950. It is my understanding that the Pyongyang chalk board list was found between those two dates. Halliman went missing 3 Sept 1950, so his timing is possible. Robert “Hallman” is sometimes confused with Halliman, but his missing date was 26 January 1953. Definitely not a candidate for Pyongyang. It appears that number 5 has an “a” in the first half and ends with “man”. More than 40 entries in my database fit that description.”

Mr. Zimmerlee provided a copy of the photograph he referred to in addition to several documents that refer to Halliman. Using Windows live photo gallery I was able to “clear up” or further focus the photograph. At that time, I made a list of the names on the board, using their numerical position, and letters that I could accurately distinguish. I was not able to identify all names, nor was I able to locate Ronald Halliman’s name on the blackboard. I sent Mr. Zimmerlee the list.

---
¹ http://koreanwarpowmia.net/Missing/MIA_IND.asp?SERV_NO=RA21931109
² John Zimmerlee, 09/08/2016
Following review of the photo an inquiry was sent regarding the location of Halliman’s name on the blackboard photograph.

When asked for his assessment of likelihood that Halliman’s name was at #5, he replied that he was unable to do so. Based on the list I prepared, Mr. Zimmerlee cross-referenced the names with his database, and provided the following information. After review, “It was becoming obvious that the logical ones all are in 24 div and early July dates. That takes Halliman out!!” Mr. Zimmerlee had no additional information or suggestions and was thanked for his support.

At this point an incomplete set of data regarding the names on the Moo Hak chalkboard leaves Ronald Halliman’s fate unknown. Mr. Zimmerlee’s annotation for Halliman remains on his web site.
In one of the documents Mr. Zimmerlee sent, there was an email exchange between himself and the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. I sent an email to the point of contact, SSG Kristen L. Duus, US Army, DPAA, Chief of External Communications.

On October 27, 2016 I received a response from SSG Duus stating, “PFC Ronald E. Halliman, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment. He was missing in action from fighting near Tabudong, ROK on 3 Sep 50. The Army issued a Presumptive Finding of Death on him 31 Dec 53. His remains have not been recovered.”

Internet search January 9, 2017, using the search term Battle of Tabudong produced a previously classified (Secret) report dated 4 March 1955, SUBJECT: Technical & Memorandum ORO-T-261, "The Structure of a Battle; Analysis of a UN-NK Action North of Taegu, Korea, September 1950".

Segments of this report will be included as they pertain to Company G, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment. The entire report is available for review at: http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/reports/after_action/structure_of_a_battle_near_taegu_korea_sep_1950_research_study.pdf.
4 March 1955

SUBJECT: Technical Memorandum ORO-T-261, "The Structure of a Battle."

1. Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is a copy of ORO-T-261, subject as above.

2. This study is a working paper of the Operations Research Office. It was prepared by the Operations Field Office in Army Forces, Far East, Eighth Army, and is not a part of the FY 1955 ORO Work Program. It is considered that this study will be of value to the Service School System.

3. The study contains a very intensive analysis of a UN-CCF action north of Taegu, Korea, September 1950. It endeavors to determine whether CCF can uncover a pattern of battle from which it may be possible to define in measure the part played by certain factors and component relationships, such as terrain, casualties, and fire power, and the cause-effect mechanism by which a battle progresses. Wherever possible data have been quantified with a view toward the development of computer methods and war-gaming techniques of operations analysis.

FOR THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:

HERBERT H. HANSFIRD
Colonel, GS
Chief, Operations and Personnel Research Division

1 incl
ORO-T-261

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IN 35-21-26
The Structure of a Battle

Analysis of a UN-NK Action
North of Taegu, Korea,
September 1950

by

Robert J. Best

18711

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The Johns Hopkins University  Chevy Chase, Maryland

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NARRATIVE DIARY FROM FRIENDLY ACCOUNTS OF THE
BATTLE IN THE SECTOR NORTH OF TAEGU, SEPTEMBER 1950

This part is a day-by-day account of the action of friendly units in the
regimental sector due north of Taegu during the period 1-21 Sep 50. The
fighting so delimited in space and time had a clean-cut beginning with the
launching of the enemy offensive on Tabu-dong; it ended cleanly with decisive
enemy defeat in the same area. The intervening enemy advance was stopped
short of Taegu at Hills 570, 314, and 660, and then the tide slowly receded. The
narrative below is concerned chiefly with the subject sector and in particular
with engagements on these hills, but it also gives a running summary of the
evolving tactical situation in the adjoining areas.

The enemy attacks north of Tabu-dong prior to the period studied are of
present interest chiefly because of the enemy’s use and loss of virtually all his
armor. These actions are described in Part II under “Supporting Armor” and
are summarized in App F.

In this part events are recorded as seen at the time through many friendly
eyes and as recorded in the command reports, war diaries, journals, and mes-
 sage logs of the units involved. Such records are the usual documentary
sources of battle data. The accounts which follow necessarily reflect the in-
completeness and emphases of the sources. It would be impractical to give the
authority for every statement, but important basic reports are often quoted,
especially in cases of disagreement, and the source is always indicated.

Up to 2400 on 9 September K-zone time was used. Clocks were then turned
back 1 hr to I-zone time, which was kept from then on. Sunrise on 12 September
was at 0547 I-time; sunset at 1821. Positions are given in terms of the 1000-yd
coordinates of the World Polyconic Grid system in use at the time, and may be
located from the marginal scales in the basic map, Fig. 2, even though the cor-
responding grid is not ruled. The position at any time of any friendly unit (com-
p any) may readily be found in the diagrams of Part III, whether or not the unit
is mentioned in the text which follows. The diagrams may also serve to keep
the over-all action in perspective.

References 1 to 24 represent all known formal reports pertinent to this study; several units apparently
did not submit command reports.
1 SEPTEMBER

The renewed enemy offensive against the UN perimeter began on the night of 31 Aug - 1 Sep 60 with massive attacks along the southern Naktong front in the zones of the 2d and 25th US Inf Divs. With part of the 2d Div's 9th Regt overrun and its 23d Regt penetrated as deeply as 8000 yd, the outlook was grave. In addition to drastic measures to avert a breakthrough toward Pusan,* a diversionary counterattack on the northern front was deemed necessary. The Eighth Army commander issued an emergency order (dated 1045, 1 September) to the commanding general of the 1st Cav Div and the chief of staff of the ROK Army directing that their forces attack without delay to seize and secure the following line:

1st Cav Div: 1138.7-1457.3 to 1139.3-1458.9 to 1138.9-1460.5 to 1137.9-1463.0 to 1138.7-1463.5 to 1143.1-1462.6 to 1144.3-1463.3 to 1146.8-1465.5 to 1149.8-1466.2 to 1150.4-1467.2 to 1151.2-1469.9 and

ROK forces: 1151.7-1470.2 to 1154.8-1471.5 to 1158.4-1475.7 to 1159.0-1477.0 to 1162.8-1481.4 to 1155.0-1482.0 to 1168.0-1480.5 to 1169.0-1480.6 to 1172.4-1482.5 to 1177.4-1483.5 to 1179.0-1483.3.

The line held by the 5th Cav Regt at that time, along the east bank of the Naktong River, would require little or no adjustment. East from the Naktong and hinged on it, the northern front would make a great swinging advance toward the northwest. The line of the 7th Cav Regt would move forward a variable distance, up to 4000 yd, and its continuation in the sector of the 8th Cav Regt would advance up to 6000 yd. At the time the order was transmitted, the 11th Regt, 1st ROK Div had just completed relief of ROK units occupying positions running northeast from the 8th Cav Regt right flank along the general line 1157-1462.5 to 1161-1467 (excluding Hill 527), and the 12th Regt, 1st ROK Div was continuing to defend against light enemy pressure along the adjacent segment of the front from 1161-1467 to 1165-1469.5. Further to the east, the 1st Bn of the 7th ROK Regt and the 15th ROK Regt were continuing to counterattack northward against enemy penetrations of the line from 1177-1465 to 1180-1466.5. It is then evident that the newly arrived 11th ROK Regt and the 12th ROK Regt were called upon to advance approximately 9000 yd, the already counterattacking 15th ROK Regt even further.

The attack plans formulated by the 1st Cav Div provided initially only for advance to that portion of the newly specified line west of the point 1144.3-1463.3. At 0900 on 2 September the 7th Cav Regt, using at least two battalions, was to seize Hill 518 (1142.0-1461.5) and Hill 346 (1139.7-1461.8). The 8th Cav Regt was to support the attack with six of its 4.2-in. mortars and cover the 7th Cav Regt right flank by advancing to Hill 290. (A hill of this designation does not appear on the map and coordinates are not given, but the numeral is repeated in many reports. Perhaps the 280-meters-plus knob 1800 yd southeast of Hill 518 at 1144.0-1460.7 was meant.) Subsequently, the 8th Cav Regt was to advance to the line 1150-1469, 1152.5-1469, further east and not as far north as specified in the Army order.

*The 1st Provabl Div was committed in the zone of the 2d Div. The two units comprising the army reserve, the 24th Inf Div and the 77th Div, were alerted but not committed here.
The 8th Cav Regt, upon which attention centers in this part, moved up to the Tabu-dong area on or about 29 Aug 50 to relieve the 1st ROK Div and 3d BN, 27th Inf Regt, which had remained in the area. The positions held by the various companies of the 8th Cav Regt on 1 September were essentially those shown in the diagram for 2 September in Part III. The high ground north of Tabu-dong and west of the highway was occupied by Co A and Co C; Co B was spread along the ridge of the west to contact the 7th Cav Regt. Company G blocked the highway by occupying the hills on either side. The remainder of the 2d BN was disposed to the east in an arc to tie in with the 11th ROK Regt. The 3d BN, 8th Cav Regt, the regimental reserve, was in position south of Tabu-dong astride the highway. According to the regimental operations orders, the 8th Cav Regt was at 70 percent of authorized strength, its morale was good, and its combat effectiveness was 75 percent.

There was little action on 1 September, as both the 1st Cav Div and the 1st ROK Div prepared to attack. Far to the east, the 15th ROK Regt seized Hwasan-doeg (1178.5-1467). The 11th ROK Regt planned to take Hill 537 (1159.3-1404.3), but apparently did not. Most of the 8th Cav Regt contacts with the enemy were on the regiment's left front, that is, in the area of the 1st BN. As early as 0445 on 31 August, the 1st Plt, Co C had used machine-gun fire and grenades (both rifle and hand) to repulse an attack by an enemy force of unknown size. During the morning of 1 September, enemy troops were seen digging in on the high ground on the west side of the highway across from Co G positions on Hill 448. Somewhat to the west, a disaffected enemy officer surrendered to Co C at 2040. Four hours later, the preliminary information he supplied was reported in the following telephone message:

020100. From S-3, 8th Cav. Report on prisoner picked up at 1147.9-1464.9. A South Korean who could speak English interrogated the prisoner picked up by the 1st Platoon, C Company, 8th Cavalry, with the results as follows: the prisoner is an officer of the 167 Platoon of the enemy forces, and he left the North Koreans to surrender at the time he was captured this evening, 1 September. The prisoner stated that during the day (1 September) groups of four or five North Koreans moved into the vicinity of C Company's front, at which point approximately 400 North Koreans were to assemble. This force when assembled had the mission of making an all-out attack supported by one (1) tank. He further stated that he (the POW) thought the attack would come off early in the morning (2 September),...*

The 8th Cav Hv Mort Co (see 2 September diagram in Part III for positions) fired continually from 0800 to 1930. In the evening, Co A and Co C exchanged small-arms fire with small groups of enemy, and Co G received 50 rd of enemy mortar fire.

North of the physical boundary between US and ROK forces, but in the ROK area of responsibility, a continuing enemy build-up was observed in a valley along the Kunwi-Tabu-dong road in the vicinity 1158.8-1470.5. Enemy supporting weapons were observed to total 31 artillery pieces plus SP guns. This target was bombed by friendly aircraft with 500-lb fragmentation bombs. During the night of 1-2 September fire was again noted coming from enemy guns in this area.

*The subsequent formal interrogation report on this prisoner is reproduced in full as Item I in App A.
Along a secondary valley leading south from the principal enemy build-up area, a patrol from Co E, 8th Cav drew fire in the afternoon. ROK forces reported later that there were two hundred enemy troops and four 120-mm mortars still further south along this valley, across from their lines at 1155.0-1453.7. The 11th ROK Regt made plans to block further enemy movement down this valley by taking Hill 537.

2 SEPTEMBER

Though the situation in the zone of the 2d Div remained serious, the enemy penetrations had been contained and some of the lost ground retaken. The absent 3d Bn (reinforced) of the 23d Regt, 2d Div was urgently needed by its still intensely engaged parent unit. The battalion remained attached to the 1st Cav Div and held positions on the division’s left flank, along the Nakdong River. In this sector, continued crossing of the river and infiltration toward Taegu by small groups of enemy were of persisting concern. To relieve the battalion, it was planned to commit the current army reserve, the 27th Brit Brig and Co C of the 75th Med Tk Bn. Though these units remained temporarily in position some forty or fifty miles south-southwest of Taegu, they were attached to the 1st Cav Div effective 2400, 2 September in an order dated 1345, 2 September. At the same time, the 19th Regt of the 24th Div, which had been reorganizing after severe losses, was ordered to move up with attachments to 1169.9-1379.0 as the new army reserve, to prepare for possible commitment in the zone of the 2d or 25th Inf Div. The other two regiments of the 24th Div were already in the line elsewhere.

The only regular infantry reserve of the 1st Cav Div was the 18th Recon Co, which had abandoned and burned its organic tanks in the August fighting. This company was not fully available, since several hundred enemy troops had infiltrated on the division’s left flank, and the company, with attached tanks of the 70th Tk Bn, had been sent to positions south and west of Taegu to block any attempt by these troops to reach the city. The 8th Engr Comb Bn, the division’s organic engineer unit, was the immediately available reserve, plus, of course, those tanks of its armor attachment (the 70th Tk Bn) that had not yet been assigned missions forward.

The 7th Cav Regt jumped off in the attack at 0900, as scheduled. Company B, 8th Cav Regt had been ordered to cover the attack by occupying Hill 290, apparently 1800 yd southeast of Hill 518. Company B reported that it had occupied its objective in the morning, without opposition. At 1230, the divisional command ordered Co L, 8th Cav to make a similar move to Hill 400, which is at 1142.8-1464.0, 2200 yd north of Hill 518 and 5 miles west-northwest of Tabu-dong. Company L, the 1st and 2d Plats of the 8th Cav Hv Mort Co (the 1st Plat for direct support of the 7th Cav), and a section from Co M, 8th Cav moved out by truck at 1410. At 1726 the task force reported that it was ready to jump off for its objective on completion of the artillery preparation. The attack was suspended shortly after it began, however, when the enemy launched an offensive against the 8th Cav itself.

On the 8th Cav front, the remaining 3d Plat of the Hv Mort Co fired continually from 0600 until about 2300, when it was ordered to displace.
The 52 ground-support plane strikes listed in the 1st Cav Div Tactical Air Control Party (TACCP) log on 2 September were all directed at Hills 346 and 518 in support of the 7th Cav Regt attack. No air strikes hit the enemy build-up opposite the 8th Cav Regt.

Formal interrogation of the prisoner picked up by Co C on the evening of 1 September yielded fuller and somewhat different information than had first obtained. He was the S-3 of the 19th Regt, 13th NK Div. According to him, the 33d and 21st NK Regts were located to the west of the highway, the remainder of the 13th NK Div to the east; the 13th Div was to make a full-scale attack at dusk (not dawn) on 2 September. At 1700 all friendly units were alerted about the impending attack.

The enemy attack materialized as predicted, beginning at about 1815 with mortar and artillery preparation. A first thrust straight down the highway was stopped by Co G. A second thrust appeared soon after dusk to the east of the highway. This apparently was the attack later reported as follows:

001330, 04-3 [8-2, 99th FA Bn]. Heavy mortar and high velocity fire coming from small town at approximately 1155.1-1460.9. Mortar from 1155.6-1465.3. Enemy closely followed barrage in attack. Enemy heavily loaded with grenades and small arms, no packs. Enemy did not follow trails but attacked across country in waves. Enemy followed closely behind withdrawing troops, hurling grenades. No enemy small-arms fire at that time. While attacking, enemy screamed loudly.3*

At 0320 on 3 September a special flight of two F4U's strafed and rocketed enemy artillery at 1155.6-1469.8, and another strike was requested for 0700. Enemy artillery was evidently well dispersed, as guns at 1155.8-1467.7 had been observed firing at 2100 on 2 September. The attacks mentioned above were first thought to be by two enemy regiments. The estimate was later reduced to one regiment.

One platoon of Co F was overrun. After an unsuccessful attempt to retake the lost ground, the company was forced to withdraw to the right to the vicinity of Hill 742, and then further to the rear. Company H also was hit. The platoon of Co G that was on Hill 346, on the right side of the road, was driven off. Thus the enemy pushed a wedge into the center of the 8th Cav line and threatened to overrun the 3d Plt of the 9th Mort Co, the only heavy-mortar support available; at 2335 the platoon was ordered to withdraw to the vicinity 1153.3-1455.6.

*A different version of the same report was also recorded and is of interest because it gives the time of the observation and, apparently incorrectly, the origin of the troops that made the attack, an important point in later analysis.

*031340, 04-3 [8-2, 99th FA Bn]. 031340 observed the enemy attack and discusses the following facts of the attack. The enemy attacked immediately after the enemy barrage of mortars ceased. The enemy came from a village at 1156.1-1466.9. They left their packs and attacked across country. Upon reaching our lines they used mainly hand grenades when engaging in close combat with our men and seemed to be conserving A/F ammo. The North Koreans came holing and screaming when in the attack.3*

Unless the attack described was that against units of the 11th ROK Regt on Hill 558 late on 2 September or during the morning of 3 September, the report would seem to be in error in assigning the origin of the troops, rather than of the supporting fires, as at the stated village, for the following reasons: (a) the enemy troops would have had to come 3 miles cross-country and climb 200 to 500 m to attack the 8th Cav; (b) this report was logged out of chronological order more than an hour after it was received (i.e., after items dated 1600), whereas the log previously cited is strictly chronological; and (c) this report has errors of typing, etc. which have been corrected, whereas that above does not.

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The ROK forces on the 8th Cav Regt right flank had not made the preventive attack on Hill 527; instead, their positions on nearby Hill 558 were the objective of a third enemy thrust. This appeared at about 2300 but was repulsed. Company E, 8th Cav, in position on the adjacent ridge, was not subjected to great pressure, but was in a difficult situation with enemy penetrations on each side. Apparently no attack was made on the left flank against the 1st Bn, 8th Cav, although Co A and Co C engaged in fire fights with probing enemy elements.

3 SEPTEMBER

On the night of 2-3 September, the enemy began a massive counterattack against the attacking 7th Cav Regt. This was launched on the left of the enemy drive against the 8th Cav toward Tabu-dong. To the east, the enemy offensive against the ROK Army also got under way. Following the repulse of the attack late on 2 September on units of the 11th ROK Regt occupying Hill 558, a new push 3000 yd to the east, at Hill 655, began. This was against the 3d Bn, 11th ROK Regt, at 0200 on 3 September. This attack was still under way at 0400, but ROK units had at that time lost no ground. Some time later, the 11th ROK Regt left flank was again attacked, and then Hill 558 fell to the enemy. The earliest report stated: "031205, Tel Message. From Shamrock [1st Cav Div Arty]. The left battalion of the 11th ROK Regiment has been pushed off Hill 558, and have fallen back to the next high ground. 'E' Company of Scrappy fell back to 'walled in' area, 1155-1459 grid square."

Somewhat later the G-3 Section, EUSA, in Taegu, received the following message: "1330. Message from KMAG. 2d [3d?] Battalion, 11th Regt ROK attacked by estimated two enemy battalions and withdrew to positions in vicinity 1159.2-1461.5, which is better defensive ground. The attack is being contained ..."

Another report at 1335 stated that ROK forces had withdrawn somewhat further, to 1159.5-1460.5.

Taken together, the following reports indicate that the enemy penetrated straight ahead between Hills 558 and 665 from his observed build-up area at 1158.0-1463.7, bypassing ROK units still on the southern slopes of these two hills:

031200. Tel Message. From Capt Kiernan. From Hill 558 (1160.8-1460.8) there are friendly troops. They can see 400-500 enemy troops at 1158-1460 headed toward 'Walled City.'

1845. Talked to Capt Cunningham [KMAG, G-3 Section] at 1845, relative the gap between the 11th ROK Regt and 8th Cav reported to be widening at that time by 1st Cav (Col Carlson). ROK reports that they believe E Company of 8th Cav to be at 1156.3-1460.2. If that is the case, the situation should be under control, because the ROKs have a company at 1157.2-1462.1 and a company at 1159.5-1461.2 and are attempting to make contact with elements of Cav. Further, the ROK 11th Regt have requested an overlay of Cav positions in order to determine their positions in order to better effect internal contact."

Whether or not Co E, 8th Cav had ever moved as far east as the line 1156.3, it had already withdrawn to the friendly rear at the time of the later report (see below). The 11th ROK Regt may in fact have moved as far west as the line 1153.3.
The EUSAK Periodic Operations Report No. 159, covering the period 1200-2400, 3 September, locates the 11th ROK Regt at 1153.3-1462.3 to 1156.2-1462.8, with other elements from 1150.3-1460.8 to 1156.3-1460.8 to 1150.3-1463 to 1160-1463 to 1160.9-1464 to 1161.3-1465.4 to 1161.5-1466.4. The central element apparently moved back still further, for at 1950 ROK forces were reported on Hill 756 at 1158.2-1458.0, along the ridge east of the "Walled City." If these reports are correct, the ROK regiment had been split, leaving a gap of approximately five thousand yards open all the way to the Walled City. However, the left ROK element, which early in the day moved west, covering the least precipitous approach, had been left isolated by the withdrawal of Co E, 8th Cav Regt, with which it would otherwise have been in contact; thus the gap had been widened.

By daybreak, the situation in the 8th Cav sector was as follows: the enemy thrust had split the 2d Bn and penetrated some 3000 yd to the friendly second line of defense; Co F had been scattered by the spearhead and had withdrawn to the rear to reorganize; Co G had moved across the road toward the west and joined Co A and Co C, which, while they held their main positions, had pulled back somewhat. The enemy was then left in possession of the high ground on both sides of the Taegu road almost as far south as Tabu-dong. Company E, which was flanked both by this penetration and by the enemy advance against the ROK forces, started to withdraw at 1000, and rejoined the 2d Bn at 1400.

Meanwhile, Co I and Co K of the 8th Cav Regt, Co A of the 8th Engr, and the tanks of the 2d Plt, Co B, 70th Tk Bn, had moved up somewhat to man a new line through Tabu-dong. Friendly infantry blocking the main enemy advance then comprised Companies B, K, and M; also the 8th Platoons of the 8th Engr Comb Bn. In addition, there were the two battalion headquarters companies; most of Co M; the 3d and 4th Platoons of the Hv Mort Co; and the Hv of Co B; 70th Tk Bn, with the 1st and 2d Tk Platoons. Batteries A and C, and presumably B, of the 19th FA Bn, were not far to the rear along the Taegu road in the vicinity of Hill 570. (The 19th FA Bn was in the rear of the 3d Cav Regt in the vicinity 1147.8-1450.8.) During the day, Co C, 8th Comb Engr was also attached as infantry, with the mission of occupying Hill 516, just west of Tabu-dong; they did so, against some enemy resistance. The regimental CP was moved back during the day from its location on the highway just south of Tabu-dong to 1153.2-1456.1, 2 1/2 miles to the rear. Companies B and L and attachments were ordered to button up during the night of 3-4 September at their positions to the west.

The enemy was quick to consolidate the penetration almost to Tabu-dong, with consequent splitting off of the 1st Bn from the regiment. At 0900 enemy troops were observed digging in on the hill just east of Tabu-dong at 1150.3-1460.5, and at 0955 somewhat further to the east along the same ridge on Hill 466 (1153.0-1460.4). At 1130 enemy mortars were seen on Hill 673, which overlooks Tabu-dong from the northwest. Armor and artillery were also brought forward. At 1030 a tank was spotted on the road within 2 miles of the village, (the one tank reported by the prisoner just after his capture?), and later in the afternoon 9 "tanks" were observed about 1 1/4 miles from it. (Most or all of

*The "Walled City" of Kason is not really a city but the crown of a mountain (Hill 902) enclosed by retaining walls. It is of religious significance to the Koreans.
these either were SP guns or the hulks of previously destroyed armor.) Two T34 tanks towing field pieces were reported knocked out by Co I as they approached its position astride the road north of Tabu-dong, and an accompanying column of troops was dispersed.

The enemy moved into the gap between the US and ROK forces. During the day, several hundred enemy troops were seen moving toward the south and east at 1157.5-1461.5 and 1158.5-1462.3. Some enemy forces had evidently already slipped through past the western rim of the Walled City well to the south, for at 1445 Co K, 8th Cav was reported driven off Hill 570, which was to its right rear. (The four coordinates reported located the hill mass without question, but perhaps the designation of the company is incorrect.) The next day the Scly Plt reported that what was estimated to be an enemy regiment had moved eastward through the gap toward ROK forces.

The controlling position of the 902-m mountain crowned by the Walled City was much appreciated. From the south, the I&R Platoon of the 8th Cav Regt, with an attachment of 150 South Korean police, was sent up to maintain contact with the enemy. It arrived there at about 1610, but by 1955 had withdrawn to the village of Namchang at the southern base of the mountain, after enemy opposition had been encountered. Company D of the 8th Engr Bn was attached to the 8th Cav Regt and at 0500 given the mission of occupying the Walled City. Plans were made to reinforce it with Co E, 8th Cav Regt. Engineer Co D made a preliminary move up from Taegu but returned in the evening when its mission was postponed.

Since the only permanent infantry reserve of the 1st Cav Div was the 16th Recon Co, two provisional rifle battalions were organized from headquarters and service personnel of various divisional units and designated as Task Force Allen (Brig Gen Allen, Asst Comdr of the 1st Cav Div). Though they were never committed, they had the mission of being ready for movement to any part of the division area within 30 min after being alerted. The composition of one of the two battalions was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 15th QM Bn</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B, 70th Tk Bn</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, Mnd and Kept Co</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co D, 9th Engr Bn</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In its move up to relieve the 3d Re of the 23d Inf Regt, the 27th Brit Brig completed its move into the 1st Cav reserve area at 1153-1442 on the north side at Taegu at 2125. Though the brigade was not available to the cavalry commander for general commitment, it was in position to block a drive from the north.

4 SEPTEMBER

In the sector north of Taegu, the intention of the command of the 1st Cav Div was to reestablish a continuous line of defense across the road at Tabu-dong and eastward along the ridge to include the Walled City, where contact
with the ROK Army would be made. Though the 8th Cav remained out of physical contact with ROK forces, the regiment, according to one observer's report at 0620, was still confident of closing the gap. From the ROKA side, closure was to be effected by redeployment of the 15th ROK Regt on the left flank of the 11th ROK Regt, but the lead unit, the 3d Bn, 15th Regt was not expected to move into position until 0430 on 5 September.

Commitment of the engineer companies completed the line at Tabu-dong. Here the enemy attack continued. At 0415, Co A, 8th Engr Bn repulsed an attack against its positions on the ridge east of the village at the cost of seven casualties. Engineer Co C, on Hill 516 just west of Tabu-dong, was now subjected to intense pressure and cut off. Covered from the west by the fire of the tanks of the 2d Plt, Co B, 70th Tk Bn, it fought its way north onto Hill 873 to join the 1st Bn, 8th Cav. Meanwhile, to block any further enemy advance south of Tabu-dong, the 2d Bn, 8th Cav (H and Hq Companies?) had been ordered to occupy the hill at 1150.2-1458.2, and by dark on 3 September had done so without opposition.

The enemy continued to attack just east of Tabu-dong. Company I, 8th Cav was pushed off the high ground at 0800, and its four attempts to retake it ended without success. Company A, 8th Engr Bn maintained its positions to the right on the ridge at 1150.5-1460.4, and Co K and Co P, 8th Cav, remained deployed further east through the grid square 1152-1460. During the morning, Co B rejoined the 1st Bn, and Co L and its attachments returned to bolster the line by replacing Co F. However, the positions of the 3d Bn became untenable when the enemy gained an observation point on Hill 466 and was able to call down observed artillery and mortar fire. The Tabu-dong line was then temporarily abandoned. The battalion withdrew about a mile to the vicinity 1152.0-
1459.0 and set up a perimeter defense. The units of the 2d Bn remaining in the area were ordered to withdraw to tie in with the 3d Bn, but they stayed through the night in the locations they then held.

The friendly operation to reoccupy the Walled City seems to have been two-pronged. Around 1345, Co D, 8th Engr reported that it was engaged in a fire fight about a half mile southwest of the Walled City while on the way up. At 1550 the company reported that it had advanced to within 200 yd of the objective, and at 1627 that forward elements were within the Walled City. It is thought that Co E, 8th Cav, met its augmentation of 125 South Korean troops at the former regimental CP at 1100 and was moved by truck south around Hill Mass 314 and then north to the village of Namchang, southeast of the Walled City, at 1150.0-1457.2. Here, at 1530, Co E passed through the 11th Plt and moved up to the Walled City through a mortar and artillery barrage. It was reported that this fire caused some of the inexperienced attached Korean troops to flee. At 1730 Co E was pinned down by small-arms and automatic-weapons fire and remained on the southern slope of the mountain during the night.

At 1845 a message from the ROK II Corps reported that a prisoner had stated that 800 enemy troops were in the Walled City and that 3 additional battalions were massed just to the north. The head of the enemy penetration was said to be at the village of Namchang. Friendly troops further forward within the walled area soon discovered that they were cut off.
To block a possible enemy attempt to penetrate far to the south from the Walled City, the ROK 5th Spi Tng Bn, a unit composed of South Korean police, was moved up from Taegu at 0220, 4 September to blocking positions at Chilgok (1153-1448). (This battalion apparently was maintained at nearly the strength of US battalions, for its strength on 15 September was 830.)

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During the night of 4 - 5 September, the 27th Brit Brig moved from the 1st Cav Div reserve area on the north side of Taegu at 1153-1442 to the division's left flank, where it took up positions along the Naktong River, relieving the 3d BCT of the 23d Inf Regt. Nevertheless, a considerable gap still remained between the 2d and the 27th Brig.

In the 8th Cav Regt sector, the situation was reported as follows:

050530. Saber 3 - Situation report as of 050530. Blue in perimeter defense 500 yard radius in vicinity 1152.0-1459.0. White ordered to move out and establish line to west of and in contact with Blue. (Orders to White via officer over telephone.) Red, no change except B Company ordered to move to vicinity 1147.0-1461.0 and establish road block. Tanks to begin patrol at dawn along MSR from Blue to junction of MSR and Burma Road (junction at 1153-1445). All 8th Cavalry forces have been committed. Out of communication with White and Blue. Radio contact with Red. Battery A, 99th FA receiving small arms fire from vicinity 1154.0-1455.5. Enemy infiltration as far south as 1154.0-1455.5. Report on D and E: E Company advanced through village and up hill toward Walled City, receiving excellent artillery support. No small arms fire, some mortar fire. Continued to move to contact D. 5

Company B was to block the Waegwan-Tabu-dong road to protect the battalion's left flank. The intention of the cavalry command apparently was still to regain Hills 449 and 466, but any operations to this end necessarily presupposed success in holding the Walled City. In the event that the situation should deteriorate here, the two provisional battalions of Task Force Allan were alerted to prepare to occupy defensive positions on the 8th Cav right flank.

At 0540 Co D, Engr was reported deployed along the wall at 1156.2-1458.6, with the enemy directly to the north. Company E, 8th Cav moved up from the position it had held on the slope during the night and joined Co D at 0700. The two companies (and remaining 60 attached ROKA troops) were intensely engaged, and shortages of ammunition and other supplies became critical. Attempts were made to resupply by airdrop, but, perhaps because of the bad visibility, all supplies landed in enemy-held territory. Plans to resupply the companies by an armored convoy were made, but at 1330 the divisional command ordered the companies to withdraw at once, and the operation became a rescue. The convoy, made up of elements of the 5v Co and the Hv Mort Co, with tanks of Co B of the 7th Tk Bn, cleared the regimental CP area at 1430 and reached the base of Hill 402 at about 1500. By 1540 Co E was already coming down from the Walled City. Because of severed communications, the message to withdraw was delayed in reaching Co D until 1930, when the company had to fight out of the Walled City. Company E had three officers and 99 men. Company D reverted to the control of its parent engineer battalion.
A comparison of the number of casualties in the opposing units at the front line is of particular interest. On the enemy side, estimates of strengths of sub-units and their casualties may be made for the 19th Regt. In accord with the data and assumptions given earlier in this part, the regiment is estimated to have had the following make-up on 1 September: total strength was 1057; of which, 1 battalion has 160; 2 battalions (280 each), 560; CP units, 1705 artillery, mortar companies etc., 167.

From the data of Table 5, it is calculated that in the period 1–6 September the 13th Div miscellaneous divisional units (with the omission of the antitank battalion, which was in a special situation) lost 17 percent of their strength (applying here again the 80 percent correction for casualties through 10 September). If the regimental rear units had a similar but somewhat greater hazard, an average depletion of 25 percent may be assumed for them. If the 337 men not in the rifle battalions of the 19th Regt, then, 84 are calculated to have been casualties. If this figure is subtracted from the 557 casualties for the entire regiment, the result is 473 rifle-battalion casualties. Of their combined initial strength of 720, they then had only 247 men left, or 34 percent of the original. number. One or two battalions very likely were depleted even more.

If it is assumed that two battalions (of 280) of the 23d Regt attacked, and that the remainder of the regiment remained in the rear and suffered 25 percent depletion, then 200 casualties are attributed to the two battalions. This figure, when added to that of the 19th Regt, gives a total of 673 casualties in enemy rifle battalions.

Friendly front-line troops may be taken to be the rifle and heavy weapons companies and the combat engineers. From Table D1 it is calculated that the 13th Div inflicted 240 casualties on these units. If the 75 percent figure of completeness is again taken into account, the number is raised to 320. The comparison for opposing front-line units may then be made: enemy casualties, 713; friendly casualties, 320; ratio, enemy/friendly, 2.2.

It is appropriate to compare the depletion of certain friendly companies with that of the enemy rifle battalions. Companies F and G were penetrated by the enemy's frontal attack. According to Table D1, both had an initial strength of 160. Through 5 September Co F suffered 63 casualties and Co G, 38. If the casualty-reporting for these hard-hit units is taken to be 65 percent complete, as suggested earlier, and if it is assumed that no replacements actually joined them at the front, then for Co F the remaining strength would have been 39 percent of the original figure, and for Co G, 63 percent.

The deployment of the opposing forces at the beginning and end of the enemy's first push is shown with attached strength figures in Fig. 7. Only units astride the highway, i.e., in the area of penetration, appear. On the west flank, the bulk of the 8th Cav Regt's 1st Bn, with Co L and elements of Co M (and with a strength of 617), was, in effect, opposed by the very weak 21st NK Regt (strength 486), though there was little actual contact. By the time of the withdrawal here on 6 September friendly strength had increased to about 800, so there was little danger of envelopment by the enemy.
The 13th NK Div evidently achieved its limited advance to Tabu-dong and beyond at the cost of temporary loss of combat effectiveness. Though its casualties were little more than double those on the friendly side, the low initial strengths did not afford leeway for much depletion with retention of organizational structure. The advance was evidently achieved by the concentration of force in a very small area, i.e., against Co G and Co F. Because of the limited scope of the offensive, it would seem that friendly units on the second line of defense could easily have moved up to meet the enemy attack and might well have held the original line. There were, of course, reasons why the reserves were not so committed.
Reserves at 7:00 a.m., 8th Engt. (Can do) 9th ROK 9th Div. 9th ROK 9th Div.

Operations planned: "Regiment to hold present positions."

Operations ordered: "B Company and L Company to button up and hold their positions for the night."

E The 11th NK Div. offensive down the highway begins. concentrations of infantry in Tahi-dong. Enemy troops dig in on high ground on both sides of road.

E The 1st Div. SP-6mm Flt moves toward Tahi-dong in support of the 79th Div.

E During the morning, a new attack by the 11th NK Div. drives the 11th ROK Regt. off Hill 116.

F Units of the 11th ROK Regt. withdraw generally to the right rear by stages during the day.

E Units of the 11th NK Div. advance rapidly toward and through the gap on the 8th Car right flank. Advanced enemy elements move onto Hill Mass 519 and drive off a friendly counter force.

F Regimental infantry reserves and armor move up to establish defense line east from Tahi-dong. The 6th Medium tanks of the 7th Plr. Co, 7th ROK Tank Bn move through Tahi-dong to take up positions to the west on the Kangsan road.

F Company F withdraws to reorganize; Co. E is virtually cut off and is ordered to withdraw at 1700. The 2nd Bn. takes up new defensive positions on the regiment's left flank.

F To reinforce the new line of defense, Company A and C of the 8th Engt., (Can do) Bn. are attached as rifle companies and occupy the anchor positions at Tahi-dong. The 8th Car NC Co. is also committed as a rifle company.

F Company D, 8th Engt. is attached and given the mission of occupying the Sailed City, moves up in the evening.

Readers' observation: Operational for aircraft all day. Scattered low clouds from 2000 to 5000 ft; no precipitation.

Ground support planes strike: 1st Cav Div—20

8th Car Regt.—2 (1470) at 0320, not in TAC PAG.